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Abstract 
This paper discusses the likely impacts of the Performance-Based Research Fund. 2003 Quality Exercise on academics 
in New Zealand. It is argued the Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) is one of a number of developments within 
the 'new manageria/ism ' of public institutions that stands to downgrade forms of professional control enjoyed by 
academics (Abbott, 1991). The downgrading of academic professions internationally is well-documented (Halsey, 1992) 
and it would be surprising if academics in New Zealand were exempt from these pressures. More unanticipated, 
however, is the extent to which academics, at least within the humanities and social sciences of universities. pursue 
strategies that collectively undercut existing forms of professional control over labour markets, peer review and public 
esteem. 
Introduction: Evaluation and the PBRF 
Halsey notes in his influential review of Brit ish 
academics that: "The attack on academic autonomy, or as 
we have described it the demand from the state that 
intellectual labour be proletarianized has been 
conspicuously aggressive in the past decade" (Halsey, 
1992: 270). 
Evaluations of university research have been introduced 
by many countries as part of the new management of 
public institutions , and reflect demands for the sector to 
be efficient and accountable (Geuna and Martin, 2003; 
Talib, 2003). The forms of evaluation d iffer, but there is 
considerable agreement over their potential to downgrade 
the forms of control enjoyed by academics as 
professionals or -perhaps more accurately given the 
embeddedness of academics in multi faceted institutions-
as semi-professionals (Abbott, 1991 ). 
The implementation of the Performance-Based Research 
Fund (PBRF) can be readily understood as a local 
example of this new managerialism wi th the potential to 
rework academic work and careers in New Zealand. 
The stated goal of the PBRF is: "To ensure that excellent 
research in the tertiary education sector is encouraged and 
rewarded. This entails assessing the research performance 
of TEOs [tertiary education organisations] and then 
funding them on the basis of their performances" 
(Tertiary Education Commission, 2004a: 3). 
The PBRF is managed by the Tertiary Education 
Commission (TEC) and in 2004 an in itial fund of $ 18.2 
million was created from I 0% of the research component 
of the existing EFTS [equivalent fu ll time student) 
funding to TEOs. In this respect, the PBRF has not 
increased the pool of funding but makes a percentage of it 
not fo llow student enrolments. The research component 
of EFTS funding will be partly replaced by the PBRF in 
stages: I 0% in 2004, 20% in 2005, 50% in 2006 and 
I 00% in 2007. This wi ll increase the size of the PBRF. 
From 2007, the ratio between PBRF and EFTS-based 
funding will be approximately 20:80. That is, the 
performance-based research fund will account for around 
one fifth of the funding to TEOs. A second round o f the 
PBRF is scheduled for 2006. 
The amount of PBRF funding that each TEO receives is 
determined by its performance across three components: a 
Quality Evaluation (QE), in which multidisciplinary 
panels assess the quality of research of academics who 
are engaged in teaching and who are employed at the 
census date for more than a year and at least 0.20 full 
time equi va lents2; a measure of research degree 
completions (RDC); and a measure of external research 
income (ERI) The ratio of funding for TEOs across the 
thre~ components QE/ RDC/ ERI is 60:25: 15. 
Reifying Hierarchies: Institutions and 
Subjects and Individuals 
The component of the PBRF exercise given the greatest 
coverage was the 2003 Quality Exercise. The 2003 
Quality Exercise made possible comparisons between 
tertiary education organisations. subjects and individual 
academics. Much of the material generated by the 
exercise has been published (Tertiary Education 
Commission , 2004b) but a wealth of furthe r information 
is yel to be mined. 
The most evident aspect of the Quality Exercise was the 
ranking of TEOs. This exposed very few surprises. Forty-
five (TEOs) were held eligible by the Tertiary Education 
Commission to complete the exercise. Twenty-two TEOs 
participated and 23 opted-out (itself no surprise as these 
institutions were likely to receive no funding benefi ts 
from the exercise). Of the twenty-two that participated 
there were eight universities (e.g., all the universities). 
two polytechnics, four colleges of education, one 
waananga, and seven private training establ ishments. 
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The results were predictable: the seven established 
univers ities were all ranked higher than the other TEOs, 
the newly promoted Auckland University of Technology 
was ranked ll 1h (behind 3 bible colleges with a combined 
Table 1: University Ranking: 
Rankine Name 
1 University of Auckland 
2 University of Canterbury 
academic complement of 28.5 FTE), and the colleges of 
education were ranked last (Tertiary Education 
Commission, 2004a: 4-11 ). 
FTE-weighted quality scores 
3.96 
3.83 
3 Victoria University of Wellington 3.39 
4 University of Otago 3.23 
5 University of Waikato 2.98 
6 Lincoln University 2.56 
7 Massey University 2. 11 
I 1 Auckland University of Technology 0.77 
(Tertiary Educat1on Comm1ssion. 2004a: 11) 
With hindsight, perhaps the University of Canterbury did 
a little better than expected and the University of Otago a 
little worse. Regardless. the rating!:. confirmed what was 
genera lly understood to be the academic pecking order: 
first Auckland. as part of a cohort made up of the 4 main 
colleges of the forn1er University of New Zealand; then 
Waikato (establi shed 1964) and the former agricultural 
colleges (Massey and Lincoln): last - and still looking like 
a polytechnic- the recently promoted Auckland 
Uni' ersity of Technology (established 2000). 
As noted, just over half of the PBRF-cligible TEOs 
constituting a majori ty of polytechnics, waananga and 
pri' ate training establishments opted out of the exercise, 
while all of the uni versities participated. This refl ects the 
reifying aspect of the 2.003 Quality Exercise and the 
'ested in terests in the process. Insofar as the 
performance-based research fund rea llocates funding to 
TEOs with the highest ratings. this is likely to reinforce 
existing divisions in resourcing. Indeed, a reallocation 
tO\\ arc..Js the universities and away from other TEOs was 
undoubtedly the main reason why the New Zealand Vice 
Chancellors Committee (NZVCC) played a leading role 
in developing and implementing the 2003 Quality 
Exerc ise (sec Bames. 2004). 
Similarly. the potentia l to reallocate resources towards 
universities (and away from other tertiary education 
org:111isations) accounts fo r the tentat ive support of the 
union, the Association of University Staff (AUS). which 
has coverage over academic and general staff in the 
universities (with the signi ficant exclusion of Auckland 
Univers ity of Technology). J Thus, criti ca l support by 
AUS for the PBRF was based on the fo llowing 
considerations: 
* The PBRF assessment should clearly distinguish the 
performance of univers it ies as research-led institut ions. 
and distribute funding accordingly; 
* lt should also address the long-standing anomaly of the 
EFTS-funding system whereby all providers receive the 
same funding per student, with no recognition of the extra 
research obl igations of universities" {Association of 
University Staff, 2002). 
Yet there are significant issues around resource allocation 
within the university sector. Thus, the University of 
Canterbury and Auckland University of Technology are 
roughly comparable in terms of academic complement 
and student numbers, but the funding mechanisms 
introduced by the PBRF wi ll significantly advantage the 
former over the latter. In 2004 alone, the PBRF will 
de liver 2.1 5% more funding to the University of 
Canterbury and 4.47% less to Auckland University of 
Technology (Tertiary Education Commission, 2004a: 80). 
This difference will increase as the PBRF delivers a 
larger share of funding, unti l 2007 when the scheme will 
be fully implemented. In 2004 the PBRF only delivered a 
I 0% ' top-up ' to funding. 
In this respect, the PBRF is likely to reify the existing 
hierarchy of universities and other TEOs. This 
differentiation is an intended consequence: "The PBRF 
rewards research acti vities of national and international 
excellence. lt therefore introduces a powerful new 
incentive for TEOs to concentrate their research around 
areas of excellence. They are encouraged to aim for depth 
rather than breadth in their research capacity" (Tertiary 
Education Commission, 2004a: I). 
However, from the perspective of academic professional 
control the diffe rences likely to be reinforced at the 
institutional (TEO) level by the PBRF are of a second 
order. Any hierarchy of un ivers ities per se does not 
constitute a threat to academic control. Indeed, it is 
possible the opposite is the case: academic careers 
typically involve promotions associated wi th movements 
between more and less prestigious universities. Of greater 
concern to academics as a profess ion is the extent to 
which the institutional differentiation reinforced by the 
PBRF reduces the total options available to them. 
Academic labour markets are typica lly constituted as core 
and periphery (Conncll and Wood, 2002). In this respect, 
a widening gap between the 'core' (Auckland, 
Canterbury. Otago, Victori a) and the ' periphery' (the rest 
of the universi ties) is of little concern . Academics should 
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be less sanguine however where the process of 
differentiation reduces the overall pay and conditions in 
the sector and where specific (low rated, under resourced) 
universities enforce disadvantageous arrangements. 
The separation of teaching and research is a significant 
concern for academics insofar as it reduces the overall 
pay and conditions of the sector. Auckland University of 
Technology has introduced elements of this division in 
the wake of the PBRF (although research track academics 
still undertake more teaching than the counterparts in the 
longer established universities). Worryingly, the 
separation of teaching and research is only a viable 
response to the PBRF insofar as it involves the 
casualization of this teaching (as senior tutors on 
permanent contracts were assessed in the 2003 Quality 
Evaluation). The move to fixed term contracts in teaching 
and in research has been a main feature of academic work 
and careers in Britain following the RAE (Collinson, 
2002) and seems likely to be used here both for reasons 
of cost efficiencies and for institutional gaming in 
response to future Quality Evaluations. That is, senior 
tutors on fixed term contracts of less than 12 months 
would not be assessed under the current PBRF 
methodology. 
The 2003 Quality Evaluation also generated considerable 
material on the subjects that comprise academia. The 
Tertiary Education Commission constituted twelve expert 
panels to assess the quality of research of individual 
academics across forty one 'subject areas'. The twelve 
multidisciplinary panels typically involved around 20 
academics comprised from the professoriate and 
including at least one senior academic employed outside 
New Zealand and one expert in Maori knowledge. The 
main task of these panels was to evaluate the Evidence 
Portfolios of individual academics and to assign a 
numeric and letter grade (R, less than 200; C 200-399; 8 , 
400-599, A 600-700). 4 
Three panels covered the range of subjects associated 
with the Arts: Social Sciences & Other Cultural/Social 
Studies (6 subjects), Humanities and Law (6 subjects) and 
Education ( I subject) (see, Tertiary Education 
Commission, 2004b: 18): 
Table 2: Social Sciences & Other Cultural/Social Studies; Humanities and Law; Education Panels 
Subject Quality Score FIE Staff Representa tion Representation I Descriptor 
Philosophy 4.74 ( 1) 64.2 (9) 
Anthropology & Archaeology 4.55 (2) 59.2 (10) 
Psychology 3.97 (3) 217.5(3) 
Human Geography 3.96 (4) 58.2( 11 ) 
History. History of Art. Classics & 3.75(5) 188.3 (5) 
Curatorial Studies 
Political Science, International 3.40 (6) 94. 1 (8) 
Relations & Public Policy 
Law 2.97 (7) 221.7 (2) 
Engl ish Language & Literature 2.75 (8) 117.9(6) 
Foreign Language and Linguistics 2.46 {9) 202.2 (4) 
Religious Studies and Theology 2.46(9) 51.3( 12) 
Sociology, Social Policy, Social Work, 2.40 ( 11) 233.3 (I) 
Criminology and Gender Studies 
Communications, Journalism and 1.59 ( 12) 97.5 (7) 
Media Studies 
Education 1.02 994.8 
The ranking of subjects also large ly confirmed the 
commonly accepted hierarchy: "In general, the best 
results were achieved by long-established disciples with 
strong research cultures ... " (Tertiary Education 
Commission, 2004b: 9). However, the assessment of 
subjects was made more contentious because of the 
decisions in grouping I creating subject areas. Thus (in 
the Arts at least), the extent to which a discipline stood 
alone in a 'subject area ' was the best external predictor of 
its Quality Score. For example, Philosophy and 
Psychology were obvious beneficiaries m th is 
on Panel FIE Staff 
I (I 0) 64.2 ( 11 ) I ( I ) 
2 (7) 29.6 (2) 2 (4) 
5 (2) 43.5(4) I ( I ) 
I (I 0) 58.2 (9) 2 ( 4)) 
8 ( I ) 23 .5(1) 6 (I 0) 
2 (7) 47.5 (5) 6 ( I 0) 
4 (3) 55.4 (8) I ( I ) 
2(7) 58.9 ( 10) 3 (6) 
4 (3) 50.5 (6) 3 (6) 
I (I 0) 51.3(7) 3 (6) 
3 (5) 77.7(12) l!( 12) 
3 (5) 32 .5 (3) 4 (9) 
I 
delineation, while the subject area of Human Geography 
also benefited from its separation from the general field 
of geography. 
More significantly, the grouping of disciplines into 
subject areas, the constitution of multidisciplinary panels 
and the methodology of assessing Evidence Portfolios 
points to the relative ly slight influence of academics as 
disciplinary practitioners in the development of the 
PBRF. While the 2003 Quality Evaluation provides 
considerable information for policymakers and a 
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powerful resource for senior management of universities, 
the benefits to disciplines and to di sc iplinary associations 
is by no means clear. Whi le the planning offices of 
individual universi ties are no doubt engaged in the 
ana lysis of the PBRF finding and strategis ing 
accordingly, the role of individual academics and their 
association:, is problematic. 
Clearly, the PBRF must have a insti tutional focus and 
should measure the extent to which the obligations laid 
out by the Education Act ( 1989), section 254(3)(a) that 
degrees must be ' taught mainly by people engaged in 
research· arc being met. However, the extent to which the 
institutions and the senior managers of institutions are 
favoured by this exercise 1•is a vis academics and thei r 
disciplinary assoc iations is extreme. This imbalance is 
exemplified in the decision made by TEC in consultation 
wi th the ZVCC to detem1ine quality categories for 
individual academics. Professor Jonathan Boston, the 
principal architect of the PBRF methodology has 
provided a rationale for this decision (Boston, 2004). The 
benefi ts of individual ratings included: it wou ld reduce 
compl iancc costs. it was congruent with research practice, 
it enhanced se lf-assessment , it was consistent with 
multidiscirlinary panels. it provided more powerful 
incentives. it was more honest and transparent (Curtis. 
author's notes rrom the plenary session. 21-5- 2004). 
Boston ( 2004) has also indicated that decision to 
individual ratings did not provide these benefits. Indeed, 
it IS difficult to find any pub lic support for individual 
ratings. In this regard. the Phase I £1'a!uation c?f the 
implementation f~(l/1(! PBRF and the conduct (~/the 2003 
{}uulitr £,-.lfuution rather wanly recommends: "That the 
indi,·idual staff member be retained as the unit of 
assessment in the Quality Evaluation". (Web Research. 
2 00-l: I)) 
lndi\'idual ratings may not provide the benefi ts hoped for 
b~ Profi.~SSl)r Boston. but they do deliver a powerful 
resource to the senior managers of universities and to 
human resou rce practitioners. Extensive interviewing has 
suggested that the potential for the Quality Evaluation to 
rnn ide a rating of individual staff proved an irresistible 
oppl)rtunity for the most senior management of 
uni versities operating as the NZVCC. The consequences 
t1f the resultant bundling of an HR component wi th the 
assessment of research arc not yet worked through. but 
seem likely to be to the detriment of academic 
rn,fcssional control. 
l\ l eet ing the ' HR Challenge' 
The methodology for assessing the research performance 
of TEOs and individual academics is complex and 
ramifications of the results will take time to work through 
(sec. Tertiary Education Commission. 2004b for an 
e\tensi\C discussion of the methodology and results). 
Nevertheless. Professor Pat Walsh. leading industrial 
relations expert and Pro VC (Commerce and Research). 
Victoria University of Wellington notes the PBRF 
strengthens and just ifies the act ivities of human rcbtions 
practitioners (HR) in uni\'Crsities: 
"Now under the previous funding system universities 
could afford - they might not have liked it - but they 
could afford to take a tolerant view of those whose 
research perfonnance was inadequate. Under the PBRF 
this wi ll become more difficult. The fundamental - and 
I 'm attempted to say unique - aspect of the PBRF is the 
one-to-one relationship it establishes between the 
research perfonnance of individual academic staff and the 
reputation and revenue of the institution. Our principal 
funder has decided that our revenue will ri se and fa ll 
directly with the assessed research perfonnance of each 
academic... The challenge for universi ties under the 
current PBRF regime will be establish perfonnance 
management systems which fai rly assess the contribution 
made by academic staff, including those whose research 
perfonnance is demonstrably unsatisfactory. ... This 
means that all universities face the fundamental HR 
challenge of developing perfonnance management 
systems which properly recognise both the collective 
nature of research production and the variable nature of 
individual contribution to the collective effort" (Walsh, 
2004}. 
The less ' tolerant ' HR and its move into the realms of 
academic endeavour is likely to be uneven across 
un iversities but has powerful drivers in the PBRF. There 
are at least four crit ical ratios in the methodology of the 
PBRF around which individual universities (and other 
TEOs) will strategise and which constitute the ' HR 
challenge·. 
It must be acknowledged that 20:80 ratio between PBRF 
and EFTS means that while the emphas is on maximising 
student numbers will abate it will remain central. 
However, high ratings under the PBRF also bring 
rcputational benefits and possible multiplier effects for 
the top-ranked universities. It seems to be assumed by 
senior management in universities that EFTS will also 
follow PBRF success. This assumption explains the 
(successful) effort on the part of the New Zealand Vice 
Chancellor's Committee (NZYCC) to ban publication of 
the part of the PBRF report (e.g., Tertiary Education 
Commission, 2004b) that made comparison between New 
Zealand and fo reign universities. It might also be argued, 
that the NZYCC considered that the perfonnance of its 
members should be exempt from the kind of comparisons 
made on academic staff in the 2003 Quality Evaluation. 
Certainly. the resources made availab le through the PBRF 
- at least fonnally disconnected from EFTS- provides 
opportunities for senior management in universities to 
strategisc. in effect to pick winners. In this respect, it is 
significant that whi le staff participation in the 2003 
Quality Evaluation was mandated by line management in 
universit ies, no agreements were secured by staff at any 
university as to how any windfall from the PBRF might 
be spent. Other key ratios in the PBRF methodology 
provide insights into the strategies and gaming that senior 
management I HR arc likely to prefer. 
As noted. the ratio fo r the components of PBRF fund ing 
is 60:25:15 between Qual ity Evaluation/ research degree 
completion/ external research income. This means that 
the greatest proportion of funding comes from the 
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assessment of the quality of research of individual 
academics. Arguably the greatest gains can come from 
improving quality scores of institutions and their 
nominated output units, although it should be noted that 
research degree completions (i.e., of PhDs) is regarded as 
a relatively soft option and is likely to attract resourcing. 
In the realm of quality scores the key ratio is the rating of 
staff in terms of AIBICIR quality scores with the 
calculation of funding. This is I 0:6:2:0. Thus, a B 
academic is worth three times as much as his C 
counterpart; an A academic is worth five of her C 
colleagues; and, a R academic is worth nothing at all. The 
HR drive is clear: to maximise A's, to identify and raise 
high B 's and C's, to minimise R 's. How this is worked 
through on an institutional basis is unclear. One Vice 
Chancellor has proposed and subsequently retracted the 
payment of bonuses to A and B rated staff. The most 
immediate and likely result is in the area of staff hiring, 
where senior management and HoDs are extremely 
reluctant to hire junior staff who may accrue R 's (the next 
census date is 21-12-2005). This is also the realm of 
unintended consequences insofar as disciplines and 
institutions that have experienced growth in recent years 
are likely to have more junior staff and subsequently R 's 
and C's than those were stable or in decline. Possibly the 
good result of the University of Canterbury vis a vis the 
University of Otago reflects this pattern. 
Not all subject areas are treated equally by the PBRF. All 
of the subject areas assessed by the Social Sciences & 
Other CulturaUSocial Studies; Humanities and Law; 
Education Panels were assigned a weighting of I with the 
exception of Psychology (with a weighting of 2) . 
Similarly the subject areas in the creative and Performing 
Arts Panels were assigned a weighting of 2. This has 
obvious consequences at the margins for the constitution 
of academic departments and units (albeit at the margins) 
insofar as a social psychologist assessed as a soc iologist 
is worth half the value of one assessed as a psychologist, 
etc. The overall effect on the Arts in comparison with 
other Facu lties is likely to be negative. The Minister of 
Finance argued recently that : 
"The Recent analysis for the Performance-Based 
Research Fund showed that New Zealand academics arc 
world-class in areas such as phi losophy and criminology; 
but we need to ensure that we are world class in 
biotechnology and the other disciplines that, in the 
medium to long-tenn, wi ll pay the bills. It is time to shift 
the balance of our tertiary system towards more of an 
explicit industry-led approach." (Cullen, 2004) 
At the same time, Professor Walsh is undoubtedly correct 
in his estimation of a new challenge for HR. The PBRF 
has provided both resourcing and a rationale for a greater 
involvement of HR practitioners and managerialism in 
general in research (and teaching). These in itiatives are 
likely to challenge the ideals of professional control by 
academics. 
Euphoria or Despondency 
Recent survey of staff by the A US (Chalmers, 1998; Scott 
and Scott, 2004) and myself (see appendix I ) indicate that 
academic staff consider themselves overworked and 
stressed. The AUS sponsored study ' Workload and Stress 
in New Zealand Universities' reported that in 1998 
academics worked on average a 53 hour week (Chalmers, 
1998: 18). This reflected that growth I massi fication of 
university enrolments. The ratio of EFTS/FTE academics 
rose from 12.5 in 1980 to 18.0 in 1991 and has remained 
constant s ince Scott and Scott (2004: 2). 
The mix of work experienced by was far from ideal. In 
1998 academics spent on average: 
• 48% of their time on teaching ( 48% in 1994) 
• 21% on research (23% in I 994) 
• 20% on internal administration and meetings (21% in 
1994), and 
• 12% on other areas (8% in 1994) (Chalmers, 1998: 25). 
Further, the 3 top-ranking changes which would make 
academics work more worthwhile were: 
*more time to spend on research or publishing (44%) 
• decreased workload 
• salary increase (23%) (Chalmers, 1998: 50). 
These results are confirmed by my own survey in which 
academics reiterate the worth of their endeavours and 
uncertainty about the benefits of the PBRF I 
managerial ism. The fi rst phase of this research involved a 
mail-out survey to all academic staff at the eight New 
Zealand universities, located in the humanities and socia l 
sciences. In late 2003, 1779 questionnaires were sent out. 
617 completed questionnaires were returned, a long with 
44 uncompleted ones. Among other things, the 
questionnaire asked academics to rate 56 statements in 
tenns of a Likert scale (Strongly Agree =5, Agree =4, 
Neutral =3, Disagree =2, Strongly Disagree = I). 
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Academics rated a question about the benefits of the PBRF only middling: 
I 33 I The Performance Based Research Funding initiative is beneficial I 2.9o 
Academics were much clearer that academic positions should combine teaching and research: 
I Academic positions should combine teaching and research 4.49 
43 The main function of the tertiary sector should be teaching 2.56 
44 The main function of the tertiary sector should be research 2.56 
49 There should be greater use of contract teaching 2.27 
51 Most academics should focus exclusively on teaching 1.86 
52 Most academics should focus exclusively on research 1.85 
And, were confident about the comparati ve quality of the NZ sector: 
5 NZ academics have much to contribute internationally 4.20 
20 New Zealand delivers world-class tertiary education 3.37 
21 The esteem in wh ich NZ research is held internationally has increased 3.28 
53 Research and teaching in NZ is usually just reinventing the wheel 1.84 
56 NZ academics have little to contribute internationally 1.58 
They were somewhat pessimis ti c about the terti ary sector: 
17 Collegiality is in decline 3.49 
25 I am pess imistic about the future of the tertiary sector 3.23 
36 I am optimistic about the future of the tertiary sector 2.72 
39 Now is a good time to be an academic 2.65 
But, were more optimistic about their own careers: 
'7 I am optimistic about my career 3.15 
38 I am pessimistic about my career 2.69 
t\ lost ~igni ficantly academics supported the •traditional' conditions of academic work and career: 
I Academic positions should combine teaching and research 4.49 
') Sabbaticals are important for good teaching and research 4.45 
-
4 The funding of conference attendance is crucial for good teaching and 4.29 
research 
6 Administrati ve work has become an unreasonable burden 4.12 
46 The tertiary sector should focus on meeting the demands of the knowledge 2.35 
economy 
49 There should begrcater use of contract teaching 2.27 
50 There should be a greater focus on wealth generat ing aspects of research 1.86 
54 The tertiary sector should be run like a business 1.70 
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However, subsequent interviews with academics and 
analysis of the qualitative survey data suggests a 
distinctly binomial response to the PBRF, in the form of 
euphoria or despondency. Academics seem split between 
overwhelming relief or abject misery about the outcome 
of the 2003 Quality Evaluation. Neither response is 
particularly promising in terms of reaffirming 
professional control. Both are suggestive of a 
disengagement with the PBRF process and, in particular, 
with the detail of the methodology used. At the same 
time, both (extreme) positions imply an alignment of 
effort with the indicators fabricated from ·on high' rather 
than a thorough interrogation of the worth and validity of 
those indicators. 
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Appendix I: Rating statements 
The table below shows statements ranked in descending order of agreement. 
N Mean SD 
Academic positions should combine teaching and research 610 4.49 .681 
Sabbaticals are important for good teaching and research 611 4.45 .742 
Academics deserve better pay and conditions 609 4 .30 .827 
The funding of conference attendance is crucial for good teaching 609 4 .29 .823 
and research 
NZ academics have much to contribute internationally 608 4.20 .676 
Administrative work has become an unreasonable burden 610 4 .12 .870 
Students should be asked to rate the effectiveness of teaching 603 4 .06 .864 
Teaching is under valued 6 10 4 .05 .978 
Tenure is crucial for good teaching and research 605 3.79 1.040 
Greater intcr-disciplinarity is a positive development 6 10 3.78 .769 
The number of students I teach and supervise has increased 592 3.77 1.107 
There should be greater inter-rt isciplinarity 600 3.73 .920 
There should be a greater appreciat ion of multiculturalism 604 3.67 .898 
Academics are high ly productive 597 3.60 .775 
Seconda_ry_ students are poorly pre_Qared for the tertiary sector 608 3.59 .980 
Soc io-economic di sadvantage is the most important equity issue 604 3.51 .952 
Coll egiality is in dec line 609 3.49 1.040 
Tertiary educati on should be free 606 3.45 1.197 
Academi c freedom is under attack 609 3.40 .980 
New Zea land del ivcrs world-c lass tertia_ry education 606 3.37 .943 
The esteem in which NZ research is held internationally has 593 3.28 .679 increased 
Intcr-disc ipl inarity is an increasing feature of the tertiary sector 607 3.27 .88 1 
Rulings requiring minimum class sizes stifle creativity and 602 3.27 1.060 innovat ion in teaching 
There should be a greater emphasis on traditional scholarship 578 3.27 .978 
I am pessimistic about the future of the tertia_ry_ sector 608 3.23 1.022 
Academi cs arc ably represented by their union 602 3.19 1.001 
I am optimistic about my career 602 3. 15 1.116 
My research endeavours are well supported 607 3.08 1.078 
My institution fosters my career development 604 3.06 1.069 
Attracting full fee pay ing students is vital fo r the futu re of the 603 3.04 1.004 
tert iary sector 
Research is under va lued 609 3.00 1.095 
The integration of Treaty issues into the curriculum should be 6 10 2.93 1.1 22 given priority 
The Performance Based Research Funding initiative is beneficia l 593 2.90 1.127 
It is very difficult to publish NZ research internationally 604 2.83 .989 
Student feedback and surveys on effective teaching are just 607 2.76 1.067 popularity polls 
I am optimistic about the future of the tert iary sector 607 2.72 1.032 
The integration of Treaty issues into the curriculum should be 609 2.69 1.196 downplayed 
I am pessimistic about my career 60 1 2.69 1.196 
Now is a good time to be an academic 610 2.65 1.002 
Equity initiati ves come at the expense of quality 605 2.62 1.085 
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There should be minimum class sizes at the postgraduate level 607 2.58 1.152 
New Zealanders should have preference in gaining academic jobs 608 2.58 1.119 
The main function of the tertiary sector should be teaching 608 2.56 1.031 
The main function of the tertiary sector should be research 603 2.56 .992 
The funding and other support of teaching and research is 602 2.49 .962 improving 
The tertiary sector should focus on meeting the demands of the 602 2.35 1.018 knowledge economy 
Women should have preference in gaining academic jobs 604 2.33 .867 
Maori should have preference in gaining academic jobs 602 2.32 1.008 
There should be greater use of contract teaching 605 2.27 1.044 
There should be a greater focus on wealth generating aspects of 609 1.86 .858 
research 
Most academics should focus exclusively on teaching 606 1.86 .708 
Most academics should focus exclusively on research 610 1.85 .720 
Research and teaching in NZ is usually just reinventing the wheel 605 1.84 .780 
The tertiary sector should be run like a business 607 1.70 .903 
Academics are an overpaid profession 610 1.60 .732 
NZ academics have little to contribute internationally 608 1.58 .885 
Notes 
1 This research is part funded by the Uni versity of Auckland Research Fund. The focus of the research is to assess how 
academic staff feel about and are responding to developments in the tertiary education sector. The first phase of the 
research involved a mail-out survey to a ll academic staff in at the eight New Zealand universities located in the 
humanities and social sciences. In late 2003, 1779 questionnaires were sent out. 61 7 completed questionnaires were 
returned, along with 44 uncompleted ones. The questionnaire asked academics: ( I ) to rate 56 statements in terms of 
a Likert scale; (2) to answer opened-ended questions about the most worrying and encouraging developments for 
the tertiary sector; and (3) to provide some biographical material (age, gender, ethnicity) and a career profi le (years 
in job, institution, academic rank, discipline, degree). The second phase of the research is ongoing and involves 
analysis of survey data, interviews with academics, university management, union representatives and staff of 
various ministries and sector organisations. 
2 While the goal of the PBRF is research focused, its origins in EFTS-based funding of teaching created at least one 
major inconsistency: staff employed on ' research only' contracts were not assessed in the 2003 Quality Eva luation 
while many (mainly senior tutors) on ' teaching only' contracts were. A number of respondents have argued that the 
inclusion of teaching in the assessment of research was necessary in order to prevent the non-uni versity TEOs from 
'gaming'. That is, the universities would be less adversely affected by the inclusion of teaching only staff that the 
polytechnics, colleges of education, waananga, and private training establishments. 
3 Staff at Auckland University of Technology are covered by the ATSE. The ATSE also covers staff at the polytechnics. 
4 Professor Paul Dalziel (2004 ), has noted that the sections on contribution to research environment and peer esteem 
were more likely to reduce the quality score of potential A academics. 
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